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A Solution to Hoffman’s Choice for 
Unauthorized Workers: Creating New 
Incentives to Report Unlawful Workplace 
Discrimination 
Andrew J. Glasnovich† 
 
Maria and Sue are coworkers at ACME Factory. They are 
also neighbors and best friends.  Additionally, Maria and Sue 
share the same supervisor at work, Ted.  One day, Ted calls Maria 
and Sue into his office to discuss declining factory production 
quotas.  Near the end of the conversation, Ted mentions that this 
quota problem could go away if Maria or Sue would go on a date 
with him.  Maria and Sue glance to each other and politely dismiss 
the remark.  Later that week, Maria and Sue decide to report Ted 
to management for his inappropriate behavior.  Management 
informs Ted, and he immediately terminates Maria and Sue. 
Distraught and unemployed, the friends take legal action.  
Maria and Sue go to the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC).  The EEOC finds that the friends were fired 
in retaliation for their complaint against Ted.  An action 
commences in federal district court and the friends seek 
reinstatement, backpay, and compensatory and punitive damages. 
As discovery closes, ACME uncovers that Maria does not 
have authorization to work in the United States.  Thus, ACME 
claims Maria is ineligible to bring suit for employment 
discrimination, because she should never have been employed by 
ACME in the first place.  The judge agrees and dismisses Maria’s 
claim, but ultimately Sue wins her case and is awarded the 
entirety of her requested relief. 
So what was different between Maria and Sue?  Do 
workplace discrimination laws apply to authorized and 
unauthorized workers differently?1  Maria and Sue were subject to 
 
 †. J.D., University of Minnesota Law School; B.A., Stetson University. 
 1. This Article uses the term “unauthorized” to refer to non-citizens persons 
without valid work authorization and declines to use the terms “illegal” or 
“undocumented.”  It is not a crime per se, so long as one is honest about his or her 
unauthorized status, to be unauthorized and to work for a wage or to apply for a 
job.  Arizona v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 2492, 2504 (2012) (“Congress made a 
deliberate choice not to impose criminal penalties on aliens who seek, or engage in, 
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the same harassment.  Somehow ACME and Ted got away with 
mistreating Maria, but were held to account for mistreating Sue. 
In 2012, the United States was home to 11.7 million people 
who did not have legal authorization to reside in the country.2  Of 
those, approximately 8 million people were active in the work 
force.3  Unauthorized workers will likely contribute $2.6 trillion 
over the next decade to the U.S. economy.4  Those unauthorized 
persons are some of the most vulnerable members of society.  
Because of their status, some unauthorized workers fear that their 
choice to report employer misconduct will lead to their deportation 
or imprisonment.5   State and federal laws prohibit employers 
from class-based discrimination against their workers—whether 
these workers are authorized or unauthorized.6  Despite those 
laws, some employer misconduct is notably egregious and includes 
wage theft, unsafe labor conditions, race and sex discrimination, 
and sexual assault.7  However, some unauthorized workers are 
 
unauthorized employment.”).  However, it is a crime for an employer to hire an 
unauthorized person or permit that person to continue work or for the 
unauthorized person to present that he or she is authorized to work. 8 U.S.C. § 
1324a(a)(1)(A), (f)(1) (2014); 8 U.S.C. § 1324c(a) (2014).  The unauthorized worker, 
however, is not the wrongful actor if an employer fails to verify or inquire of the 
worker’s status.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1324c (a). 
 2. Jeffery S. Passel et al., Population Decline of Unauthorized Immigrants 
Stalls, May Have Reversed, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Sept. 23, 2013), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2013/09/23/population-decline-of-unauthorized-
immigrants-stalls-may-have-reversed. 
 3. Jens Manuel Krogstad & Jeffrey S. Passel, 5 Facts About Illegal 
Immigration in the U.S., PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 19, 2015), 
http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2015/11/19/5-facts-about-illegal-immigration-
in-the-u-s/. 
 4. See Raúl Hinojosa-Ojeda, Raising the Floor for American Workers: The 
Economic Benefits of Comprehensive Immigration Reform, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 
(Jan. 7, 2010), 
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/immigration/report/2010/01/07/7187/raisi
ng-the-floor-for-american-workers (stating that mass deportation would reduce the 
cumulative GDP of the United States by $2.6 trillion over 10 years “not including 
the actual cost of deportation”). 
 5. This is the titular “Hoffman’s Choice”:   to report the discrimination or to be 
deported.  See S. POVERTY LAW CTR., INJUSTICE ON OUR PLATES: IMMIGRANT 
WOMEN IN THE U.S. FOOD INDUSTRY 21–41 (2010) (describing the workplace 
violence and harassment faced by immigrant women), 
https://www.splcenter.org/sites/default/files/d6_legacy_files/downloads/publication/I
njustice_on_Our_Plates.pdf. 




 7. Id. 
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brave enough to risk deportation and CHALLENGE their 
employers’ unlawful practices.8 
This Article will identify how federal law protects 
unauthorized workers from class-based discrimination and will 
define the proper scope of relief for violations of these laws.  First, 
this Article examines a conflict in federal law that creates an 
incongruence between the purported right to a workplace free of 
discrimination and the corresponding claims for relief available to 
unauthorized workers.  Next, this Article proffers a new analytical 
framework, based on state law examples, to resolve this legal 
quagmire, arguing that current jurisprudence does not apply to 
antidiscrimination statutes.  Finally, this Article proposes that 
Congress amend Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title 
VII) to correct the U.S. Supreme Court’s misapplication of 
immigration law, which stripped unauthorized workers of the 
basic protections of dignity and workplace security. 
I. How the Law Disincentivizes Unauthorized Workers 
from Reporting Discrimination 
Two seemingly unrelated statutes predominate this analysis:   
The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) and Title VII.  In 
comparing the overarching policies of both statutes, one must 
resolve the question:  Can unauthorized workers sue and receive 
monetary awards that purport to compensate for lost wages—
wages that, under IRCA, these workers unlawfully earned? A 
cursory look at these two statutes illuminates the problem. 
A. Immigration Law Creates Negative Consequences for 
Reporting Discrimination 
IRCA’s goal is to discourage the flow of undocumented 
persons into the United States.9  IRCA prohibits an employer from 
hiring a person not authorized to work in the United States, 
penalizing the employer for failing to confirm eligibility. This in 
turn has negative consequences for the unauthorized employee.10   
A violation of these provisions subjects the unlawful actor to both 
 
 8. See D. Carolina Núñez, Fractured Membership: Deconstructing 
Territoriality to Secure Rights and Remedies for the Undocumented Worker, 2010 
WIS. L. REV. 817, 855–60 (discussing legal strategies authorized employees have 
used to attempt to hold their employers accountable). 
 9. See Statement by President Ronald Reagan Upon Signing S. 1200, 1986 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5856. 
 10. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(a)(1)(A) (2014) (making it unlawful to knowingly employ 
or recruit a non-citizen who is ineligible for employment in the United States). 
560 Sua Sponte: Law & Inequality Online [Vol. 34: 557 
civil fines and criminal penalties, including the possibility of 
deportation for an unauthorized person.11 Congress did not, 
however, intend IRCA to block unauthorized workers’ access to 
discrimination protections offered by other statutes.12 
Paramount among these anti-discrimination statutes, Title 
VII protects an individual from unlawful employment practices 
based on his or her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.13  
Congress enacted Title VII to rid the work place of invidious 
discriminatory practices.14  Congress recognized that racial and 
sexual discrimination impose a high cost on society and that 
bringing to light this discrimination is a compelling governmental 
interest.15  Title VII provides various remedies to the unlawful 
employment practice, including reinstatement, backpay,16 and 
punitive and compensatory damages.17  
The Supreme Court has held that, for analogous workplace 
claims under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), IRCA 
precludes unauthorized workers from obtaining wage-like 
damages.18  In Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, the 
Court found that the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), an 
administrative agency, did not have the authority to award 
backpay to an unauthorized worker.19  The Court reasoned that 
the NLRB, in its capacity enforcing the NLRA, did not have the 
 
 11. 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(e)(4), (f)(1). 
 12. See H. COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, H.R. REP. NO. 99-682(II), reprinted in 
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5758 (“[T]he committee does not intend that any provision 
of this Act would limit the powers of . . . the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission . . . in conformity with existing law, to remedy unfair practices 
committed against undocumented employees for exercising their rights before such 
agencies or for engaging in activities protected by these agencies.  To do otherwise 
would be counter-productive of our intent to limit the hiring of undocumented 
employees and the depressing effect on working conditions caused by their 
employment.”). 
 13. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2014). Congress later strengthened Title VII with 
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, Secs. 2, 3 (“The 
Congress finds . . . that additional remedies under Federal law are needed to deter 
unlawful harassment and intentional discrimination in the workplace . . . .”). 
 14. See United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 231 (1979) (citing 
U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 1964, at 2401). 
 15. See Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 193 (1990). 
 16. Backpay is one of the most common remedies awarded for a violation of 
Title VII.  Though a court may consider many remedies, an award of backpay is a 
presumption that must be overcome.  City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. 
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 719 (1978); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 
421 (1975). 
 17. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(1) (2014); see Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447, 452 
(D.C. Cir. 2007) (discussing backpay and frontpay remedies under Title VII). 
 18. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 151 (2002). 
 19. Id. at 151–52. 
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authority to contravene the policy behind IRCA.20  The Court, 
however, did not allow the employer-defendant to avoid liability, 
but instead found the NLRB could enforce other “‘traditional 
remedies’ sufficient to effectuate national labor policy regardless of 
whether . . . backpay accompanies them.”21 
The Hoffman Court declined to decide whether backpay, as a 
remedy, was per se foreclosed to unauthorized workers.22  Critics 
of the Hoffman majority point out that hiring unauthorized 
workers would lower the employer’s cost of violating labor laws, 
making unauthorized workers more attractive to hire and 
exploit.23  This would thereby also undermine IRCA.24  To critics, 
backpay would be an appropriate remedy, not just because it 
compensates the employee, but because it punishes the 
employer.25 
B. Courts Place the Blame on the Worker Instead of the 
Discriminating Employer 
Though Hoffman soundly answered the question of what 
remedies were available to an unauthorized worker under the 
NLRA, it did not answer that question for Title VII.26  Many lower 
courts have held Hoffman inapplicable to Title VII “because 
neither Title VII nor IRCA clearly expresses Congress’s intent to 
exclude foreign nationals without proper work visas from Title 
VII’s coverage . . . although [a plaintiff’s] visa status and eligibility 
for employment may limit her remedies.”27 
 
 20. Id. at 149 (“[A]warding backpay to illegal aliens runs counter to policies 
underlying IRCA, policies the Board has no authority to enforce or administer.”). 
 21. Id. at 152. Contra Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 186 
(4th Cir. 1998).  For an overview of how Hoffman affects the Fair Labor Standards 
Act, see Andrew S. Lewinter, Hoffman Plastic Compounds v. NLRB: An Invitation 
to Exploit, 20 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 509, 524–530 (2003). 
 22. Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 147. 
 23. Id. at 156 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 24. Id. at 157. 
 25. Id. at 160 (“After all, the same backpay award that compensates an 
employee in the circumstances the Court describes also requires an employer who 
has violated the labor laws to make a meaningful monetary payment.”). 
 26. E.g., Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 364 F.3d 1057, 1067 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding a 
Title VII case distinguishable from Hoffman); Iweala v. Operation Tech. Serv., Inc., 
634 F. Supp. 2d 73, 79  (D.D.C. 2009); Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 
2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 2003) (holding plaintiff was barred from backpay but not 
from reinstatement after he obtained authorized status). 
 27. Iweala, 634 F. Supp. 2d at 80; accord Lamonica v. Safe Hurricane Shutters, 
Inc., 711 F.3d 1299, 1307 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding that Hoffman does not put ICRA 
in conflict with the Fair Labor Standards Act); Maderia v. Affordable Hous. Found., 
Inc., 469 F.3d 219, 227 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding that federal immigration law does 
not preempt a New York state law allowing unauthorized workers to recover 
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Not all courts have found Hoffman to be irrelevant in the 
Title VII context.  In Escobar v. Spartan Security Services, an 
unauthorized worker brought sexual harassment and sex 
discrimination claims under Title VII.28  Subsequent to his 
employment and the discriminatory incidents at Spartan, Escobar 
obtained authorization to work in the United States.29  However, 
Escobar’s lost wages occurred prior to his work authorization.  The 
court found that, although Hoffman only addressed claims under 
the NLRA, the logic of Hoffman “compels the conclusion that 
Escobar is not entitled to backpay on his claims under Title VII.”30 
In contrast, the Ninth Circuit rejected Hoffman’s absolute 
bar to backpay under Title VII.31  In Rivera v. NIBCO, Inc., 
twenty-three immigrant plaintiffs alleged NIBCO’s English 
language skills test had an adverse effect on their employment 
status based on their national origin.32  The Ninth Circuit declined 
to enforce Hoffman’s prohibition on backpay to Title VII.33   The 
court found that, because Title VII and the NLRA have different 
statutory language and were enacted to serve different purposes, 
Hoffman was not directly applicable to Title VII.34 
The agency that enforces Title VII, the EEOC, considers 
unauthorized workers to be protected by anti-discrimination 
laws.35  The EEOC initially took the position that unauthorized 
workers are eligible for backpay and other remedies “to the same 
extent as authorized workers . . . .”36  As case law evolved away 
from allowing backpay for unauthorized workers, the EEOC has 
 
compensatory damages for lost wages); see Christopher Ho & Jennifer C. Chang, 
Drawing the Line After Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: Strategies for 
Protecting Undocumented Workers in the Title VII Context and Beyond, 22 
HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 473, 499 (2005); Michael H. Leroy, Overruling Precedent: 
“A Derelict in the Stream of the Law,” 66 SMU L. REV. 711, 732–33 (2013) (noting 
cases that agree and disagree with Hoffman). 
 28. Escobar, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 896. 
 29. Id. at 896. 
 30. Id. at 897. 
 31. Rivera, 364 F.3d at 1067. 
 32. Id. at 1061. 
 33. Id. at 1068. 
 34. Importantly, Title VII protects individuals from invidious, class-based 
discrimination, while the NLRA ensures fairness in labor negotiations.  Rivera, 364 
F.3d at 1067 (“The NLRA and Title VII are different statutes in numerous respects. 
Congress gave them distinct remedial schemes and vested their enforcement 
agencies with different powers.”). 
 35. Enforcement Guidance on Remedies Available to Undocumented Workers 
Under Federal Employment Discrimination Laws, EEOC, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/undoc.html (last visited  Mar. 27, 2016). 
 36. Id. 
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held firm on its stance that unauthorized workers are, 
nonetheless, protected by the statutes the EEOC enforces.37 
C. California Took a Stand for Unauthorized Workers 
In partial response to Hoffman, states took various 
approaches to shield their worker protection laws from IRCA’s 
reach.38  California, for example, enacted Senate Bill 1818 (S.B. 
1818) to amend its Title VII equivalent, the Fair Housing and 
Employment Act (FHEA), to explicitly protect unauthorized 
workers.39 
In Salas v. Sierra Chemical Co., the California Supreme 
Court refused to apply Hoffman’s prohibition on backpay against 
unauthorized workers who sought relief under FHEA.40  The court 
examined whether Hoffman preempted FHEA.41  Similar to the 
Ninth Circuit in Rivera, the California Court decided both that the 
damages and the private cause of action found in the FHEA 
differed substantially from the administrative procedures in the 
NLRA.42  Thus, the differing remedial goals of the NLRA and 
California’s FHEA justified distinguishing Salas from Hoffman.43 
 
 37. EEOC Reaffirms Commitment to Protecting Undocumented Workers from 
Discrimination, EEOC (June 28, 2002), 
http://www1.eeoc.gov//eeoc/newsroom/release/6-28-02.cfm. 
 38. See, e.g., Solis v. SCA Rest. Corp., 938 F. Supp. 2d 380, 401 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(“Hoffman does not preclude an award of backpay to undocumented workers.”); 
Zaldivar v. Rodriguez, 819 N.W.2d 187, 194 (Minn. Ct. App. 2012) (“[T]he 
Minnesota Supreme Court rejected the reasoning of Hoffman.  Our supreme court 
reasoned that the state legislature is the appropriate body to determine whether an 
unauthorized alien who is otherwise entitled to workers’ compensation benefits 
should be disentitled on the basis of his or her immigration status.”) (citing Correa 
v. Waymouth Farms, Inc., 664 N.W.2d 324, 331 (Minn. 2003)); see also Oliver T. 
Beatty, Workers’ Compensation and Hoffman Plastic: Pandora’s Undocumented 
Box, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1211, 1233–34 (2011). 
 39. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12921 (West 2014); S.B. 1818, 2002 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2002) (enacted) (“All protections rights and remedies available under state law, 
except any reinstatement remedy prohibited by federal law, are available to all 
individuals regardless of immigration status who have applied for employment, or 
who are or who have been employed, in this state.”); see Kiren Dosanjh Zucker, 
From Hoffman Plastic to the After-Acquired Evidence Doctrine: Protecting 
Undocumented Workers’ Rights Under Federal Anti-Discrimination Statutes, 26 
WHITTIER L. REV. 601, 607 (2004). 
 40. Salas v. Sierra Chem. Co., 327 P.3d 797, 804–05 (Cal. 2014), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 755 (2014). 
 41. Id. at 800. 
 42. Id. at 804. 
 43. Id. (“Because of this critical difference between California’s FHEA and the 
federal NLRA, relating to the role played by lost pay awards in achieving 
California’s remedial legislative goal, we do not consider . . . Hoffman controlling 
here.”). 
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In spite of this distinction, the California Supreme Court 
found that, once an employer has discovered a plaintiff’s 
unauthorized status, an award of backpay would conflict with 
IRCA.44  In Salas, however, the employer-defendant was aware of 
the plaintiffs’ unauthorized status and continued to allow them to 
work.45  Thus, the court held that the employer could not invoke 
the IRCA defense to avoid backpay damages.46 
II. How to Incentivize Unauthorized Workers to Report 
Discrimination 
A. Provide Damages for Irreparable Harm 
Assuming Hoffman indeed bars claims for lost wages, an 
unauthorized worker may still recover compensatory and punitive 
damages.47  Congress amended Title VII in 1991 to include awards 
for less tangible harms.48  An award for these non-economic 
damages serves to ferret out invidious discrimination, furthering 
the policy behind Title VII.  These irreparable damages, however, 
do not purport to compensate for lost wage, and thus do not 
obstruct IRCA’s goal of dissuading unlawful immigration.49 
Distinguishing between the remedial purposes of backpay 
and awards for irreparable harm is crucial to understanding why 
awards of irreparable harm avoid Hoffman’s grasp.  Compensatory 
damages under Title VII address harms stemming less concretely 
from a wrongful employment act, i.e. harms other than wage 
loss.50  For instance, a manifestation of severe emotional injuries 
is enough to warrant compensatory damages.51  Punitive damages, 
comparatively, punish egregious, willful discrimination by an 
employer; they do not purport to compensate for any 
individualized harm.52 
 
 44. Id. at 811. 
 45. Id. at 812. 
 46. Id. 
 47. See Ho & Chang, supra note 2728, at 493; Cheryl Krause Zemelman, The 
After-Acquired Evidence Defense to Employment of Discrimination Claims: The 
Privatization of Title VII and the Contours of Social Responsibility, 46 STAN. L. 
REV. 175, 208 (1993). 
 48. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, Sec. 2. (1991). 
 49. See Ho & Chang, supra note 27, at 493. 
 50. E.g., EEOC v. Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp., Inc., 491 F.3d 790, 797 
(8th Cir. 2007) (exploring the type of non-economic damages available to a plaintiff 
under the Americans with Disabilities Act). 
 51. Id. 
 52. 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (2014). 
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Thus, Hoffman’s logic53 supporting a denial of backpay under 
IRCA does not similarly support a denial of non-economic damages 
under Title VII.54  Compensatory and punitive damages should not 
be viewed as similarly repugnant to IRCA because they do not 
purport to compensate for unauthorized work; rather, they remedy 
the individual and societal effects of discrimination, punishing 
employers for their wrongful acts.55  Therefore, relying on 
compensatory and punitive damages to deter an employer from 
discriminating fits both the majority’s and the dissent’s views in 
Hoffman.56 
B. Allow the EEOC to Seek All Types of Damages 
While an employee-plaintiff’s remedies are aimed at making 
him or her whole, the EEOC’s core mission is to rid the workplace 
of discrimination.57  By seeking monetary awards like backpay, 
the EEOC would dissuade employers from acting unlawfully in a 
way an individual plaintiff could not.58  Thus, to achieve this 
mission, it is appropriate and necessary for the EEOC to seek 
those remedies that may be barred for unauthorized workers 
under current case law. 
When the EEOC initiates an action in court to enforce Title 
VII, it does so not as the attorney of the plaintiff-employee, but on 
behalf of the public’s interest in eliminating discrimination.59  
Though the plaintiff-employee may be barred from a monetary 
remedy, it is arguable that the EEOC may not be barred from 
seeking that same award from the employer.60  When the EEOC 
 
 53. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB. 535 U.S. 137, 150 (2002). 
 54. See id.; Convergys Customer Mgmt. Grp., 491 F.3d at 797. 
 55. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2014) (outlining remedies that make a 
defendant whole), with 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (authorizing punitive damages). 
 56. See Zemelman, supra note 47, at 208. Compare Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 150 
(Rehnquist, C.J.) (“[The employee] cannot mitigate damages, a duty our cases 
require . . . .”), with id. at 160 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]he same backpay award 
that compensates an employee in the circumstances the Court describes also 
requires an employer who has violated the labor laws to make a meaningful 
monetary payment.”). 
 57. See Jennifer Miyoko Follette, Complete Justice: Upholding the Principles of 
Title VII Through Appropriate Treatment of After-Acquired Evidence, 68 WASH. L. 
REV. 651, 652 (1993); Nancy M. Modesitt, Reinventing the EEOC, 63 SMU L. REV. 
1237, 1240 (2010). 
 58. See, e.g., Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 153 
(2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[Backpay] reasonably helps to deter unlawful 
activity that both labor laws and immigration laws seek to prevent.”). 
 59. See Evangelina Fierro Hernandez, EEOC Class Action Litigation, PRAC. 
LITIGATOR, Mar. 2008, at 39, 40–41. 
 60. See EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 288 (2002). 
566 Sua Sponte: Law & Inequality Online [Vol. 34: 557 
discovers a class of individuals who have suffered discrimination 
during its investigation of another claim, the EEOC may collect an 
award on the newly discovered persons’ behalf regardless of any 
encumbrances those individuals would have in bringing suit.61 
IRCA does not explicitly compel the EEOC to verify a 
claimant’s status because the EEOC is not their employer.62  Nor 
is the EEOC collecting a wage on behalf claimants; rather, the 
EEOC is collecting damages for a wrongful act committed against 
workers and society.63  By collecting on behalf of this group, the 
EEOC remedies the past discrimination, punishes the employer 
for its act, discourages future wrongful acts by the employer, and 
sends a message to other employers that these actions are 
intolerable.64  This serves the EEOC’s general goal of 
implementing Title VII.65  It would greatly weaken Title VII if a 
court were to restrict the EEOC from implementing this important 
public policy because of one employee’s wrongful act.66  It is also 
inconsistent with other cases that hold the EEOC is not barred by 
conflicting statutory schemes.67  For instance, the EEOC is not 
barred if a plaintiff-employee signs an arbitration agreement, 
despite the strong public policy interest the Supreme Court finds 
in upholding the validity of arbitration clauses.68 
C. Congress Must Act to Amend Title VII 
In amending its employment discrimination laws, the 
California legislature signaled that its courts should uphold 
workplace protections for unauthorized workers.69  Although 
 
 61. Id. (“‘[T]he EEOC is not merely a proxy for the victims of 
discrimination . . . .’”)  (citation omitted); accord In re Bemis Co., 279 F.3d 419, 421 
(7th Cir. 2002) (noting the EEOC does not need to comply with class certification 
requirements). 
 62. Compare Enforcement Guidance on Remedies Available to Undocumented 
Workers Under Federal Employment Discrimination, supra note 35 (discussing the 
remedies which the EEOC may seek on behalf of unauthorized employees), with 
Del Rey Tortilleria, Inc. v. NLRB, 976 F.2d 1115, 1117 (7th Cir. 1992) (rejecting the 
NLRB’s effort to require an employer to pay backpay to unauthorized immigrants) 
and 8 U.S.C. § 1324a (2012) (making it unlawful for an employer to knowingly hire 
an unauthorized employee). 
 63. See Follette, supra note 57, at 667. 
 64. See Remedies for Employment Discrimination, EEOC, 
http://www.eeoc.gov/employers/remedies.cfm (last visited Oct. 19, 2014). 
 65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (2014). 
 66. Zemelman, supra note 47, at 194–95. 
 67. See, e.g., EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc., 534 U.S. 279, 288 (2002) (declining to 
apply an arbitration limitation to the EEOC on policy grounds). 
 68. Id. at 288–89. 
 69. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12921 (West 2014); S.B. 1818, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. 
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Congress similarly intended that IRCA not abrogate workplace 
protections, the Supreme Court has so far failed to resolve 
conflicts between IRCA and employment laws in line with 
Congress’s intent.70  It is therefore necessary to amend IRCA to 
make explicit Congress’s intention to leave intact Title VII 
protections for all workers, including those without authorization 
to work. While California’s S.B. 1818 worked to effect a worker-
friendly result in Salas,71 it is not enough for individual states to 
enact their own protections.  Salas is the perfect example of how 
state statutes will fail to fully resolve the issues created by 
Hoffman.  In Salas, though the California Court recognized the 
plaintiff’s right to recover fully, it noted not all plaintiffs could 
obtain  similar results, because ignorance of a worker’s 
immigration status can still be used to invoke equitable defenses.72 
The ultimate solution thus lies in the hands of Congress. A 
statute similar to California’s S.B. 1818 would make clear that all 
“rights and remedies”  available to authorized workers are also 
available to unauthorized workers; any equitable escape from 
liability should be denied to  employers.73  This amendment would 
match Congress’s past attempts to protection Title VII from the 
Court.74  It would further make Congress’s original intent clear: 




 70. Compare H. COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 2, at 8 
(1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5758 (“[T]he committee does not 
intend that any provision of [IRCA] would limit the powers of State or Federal 
labor standards agencies . . . .”), and 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1) (prohibiting employers, 
under IRCA, from discriminating based on “an individual’s national origin” or 
“citizenship status”), with McKennon v. Nashville Banner Pub. Co., 513 U.S. 352 
(1995) (allowing some backpay for a wrongfully discharged employee under the 
[Age Discrimination in Employment Act] even though the employer later 
discovered evidence of the employee’s wrongdoing which would have led to her 
discharge) and Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 150 
(2002) (prohibiting backpay under NLRB for unauthorized employees). But see 
Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 157 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (stating that IRCA is not intended 
to undermine existing labor laws). 
 71. Salas v. Sierra Chem. Co., 327 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 
755 (2014). 
 72. Id. at 812; cf. Avina v. Target Corp., No. 2:13-cv-07546-CAS, 2014 WL 
3704544, at *7 (C.D. Cal. July 18, 2014) (applying Salas and rejecting defenses of 
unclean hands and after-acquired evidence to limit an employer’s liability). 
 73. CAL. GOV’T. CODE § 12921 (West 2014). 
 74. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, Sec. 2. (1991). 
 75. See 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1); H. COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, H.R. REP. NO. 
99-682, pt. 2, at 8 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5758. 
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Further, an analogous federal statute would resolve the two 
lingering questions in federal courts about IRCA and Title VII.  
First, courts currently leave the question of whether unauthorized 
workers are qualified employees under Title VII unanswered.76  
This would be resolved by the language:  “[a]ll protections . . . are 
available to all individuals regardless of immigration status who 
have applied for employment or who are or who have been 
employed . . . .”77  This language refutes the presumption that 
authorized status is required for a cause of action under Title VII. 
Second, the courts must answer the question:  What precise 
remedies under Title VII does IRCA limit?  This question would be 
answered by the language:  “[a]ll . . . remedies available under 
[the] law . . . to all individuals regardless of immigration status.”78  
This proposal represents a normative choice, rejecting the notion 
that extraneous factors, like a victim’s immigration status, should 
excuse an employer’s discriminatory conduct. 
Congress must make a deliberate value choice when 
determining what wage-like remedies will remain unavailable to 
unauthorized persons.   A Congressional amendment to IRCA 
should only exclude the remedies of frontpay and reinstatement 
for unauthorized workers because these remedies would certainly 
contravene IRCA’s prohibition on unauthorized work. By awarding 
front pay and reinstatement, Congress would acknowledge the 
right of an unauthorized worker to continue to be paid in 
contravention of IRCA.  This seems the most untenable option 
because of the Congress’s express policy dissuading unauthorized 
workers from remaining in the United States.79  Because these 
remedies could one day be an option for an unauthorized worker 
who later obtains authorization, reinstatement and front pay 
should only be excluded to those currently unauthorized.80 
The status of backpay under an amendment to IRCA would 
likely be the most contentious.  Backpay serves two distinct 
purposes.  First, backpay compensates a wrongfully terminated 
worker.81  Second, backpay punishes the unscrupulous employer.82  
 
 76. E.g., Escobar v. Spartan Sec. Serv., 281 F. Supp. 2d 895, 897 (S.D. Tex. 
2003). 
 77. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12921 (West 2014). 
 78. Id. (emphasis added). 
 79. See Egbuna v. Time-Life Libraries, Inc., 153 F.3d 184, 186–87 (4th Cir. 
1998); Ho & Chang, supra note 27, at 499. 
 80. E.g., Escobar, 281 F. Supp. 2d at 896; see Ho & Chang, supra note 27, at 
499. 
 81. See City of L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 719 
(1978). 
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Thus, if Congress’s favored policy is to preclude unauthorized 
workers from obtaining wage-like remedies, it should prohibit 
backpay.  If, however, Congress’s favored policy is to discourage 
discrimination by creating an economic disincentive for employers, 
it should not exclude backpay.  Congress should choose to include 
backpay as an explicit remedy for unauthorized workers because 
backpay compensates for the wrongful act of the employer. But for 
the employer’s wrongful conduct, the unauthorized worker would 
have earned that pay.  Congress should not punish unauthorized 
workers by erasing any hope of monetary compensation from a 
discrimination claim. 
Though a statutory solution will provide the most decisive 
end to this debate, a resolution will be wrapped up in a larger 
battle in Congress for comprehensive immigration reform.83 
III. Hoffman Enacts an Unintended Punishment on 
Unauthorized Workers 
None of the existing judicial or legislative solutions discussed 
in this Article allow an unauthorized worker to access the exact 
remedies are available to those authorized to work.  This failure to 
provide equal protections in employment is a latent punishment in 
IRCA.84  Though Title VII seeks to protect those historically 
disadvantaged groups, the Supreme Court’s view of IRCA further 
marginalizes them.85 
In passing S.B. 1818, California made clear its preference for 
protecting unauthorized workers from discrimination.86   Congress 
should take similar, explicit action to prevent Title VII and IRCA 
from being subverted by the Hoffman Court.87  Congress should 
pass an amendment to IRCA’s existing, explicit prohibition on 
national origin discrimination. 88 The amendement should make it 
 
 82. Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB, 535 U.S. 137, 149 (2002) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 83. See Michael D. Shear, Obama, Daring Congress, Acts to Overhaul 
Immigration, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/21/us/obama-immigration-speech.html. 
 84. See Zemelman, supra note 47, at 211. 
 85. Compare Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 pmbl., 78 Stat. 241, 
with Hoffman, 535 U.S. at 153. 
 86. CAL. GOV’T CODE § 12921 (West 2014); S.B. 1818, 2002 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 
2002). 
 87. See Thomas J. Walsh, Hoffman Plastic Compounds, Inc. v. NLRB: How the 
Supreme Court Eroded Labor Law and Workers Rights in the Name of Immigration 
Policy, 21 LAW & INEQ. 313, 329–38 (2003). 
 88. 8 U.S.C. § 1324b(a)(1); accord H. COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, H.R. REP. 
NO. 99-682, pt. 2, at 12, (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5757, 5761 (“The 
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clear that a person’s work-authorization status is not grounds to 
limit remedies under Title VII.89  This would send a strong 
statement that the promises of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 truly 
do not depend on the condition of one’s birth, but are rooted in the 
principles of equal opportunity for all.90 
 
Committee . . . strongly endorses this provision and the [sic] has consistently 
expressed its fear that the imposition of employer sanctions will give rise to 
employment discrimination against Hispanic Americans and other minority group 
members.”). 
 89. See, e.g., H. COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, H.R. REP. NO. 99-682, pt. 1, at 58 
(1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5649, 5662. 
 90. See Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352 pmbl., 78 Stat. 241 (1964). 
